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• We study a co-financing agreements option under reciprocity.
• The option can lead to maximal public good investment only if very few sign.
• Formal agreements can thus ignite informal cooperation underpinned by reciprocity.
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1 Introduction
Institutions play an important role in creating the conditions for investment
in public goods. Among other things, they facilitate the negotiation and
enforcement of binding agreements. One common type of agreement is a
co-financing, or cost-sharing, agreement; signatories make a binding commit-
ment to co-finance each other’s future public good investments. The agree-
ment does not commit a signatory to invest in public goods per se. However,
should any signatory initiate a public good investment, its co-signatories are
committed to share the cost.1 Such agreements have been used to finance
critical investment in public goods, ranging from disease eradication to cli-
mate change mitigation.2
Theoretically, co-financing agreements can increase public good invest-
ment (cf. Varian 1994).3 This is because a signatory can be pivotal in
inducing other signatories to invest in public goods, as only with its par-
ticipation would the private cost of a public good be less than the private
benefit. However, full investment remains impossible. This is because when
there are many signatories, an individual signatory is no longer pivotal, thus
it deviates to not signing and not investing.
These insights rely on the assumption that agents care only about their
material payoffs. Yet behaviour in public good contexts often exhibits condi-
tional cooperation (e.g. Fischbacher et al. 2001), cooperating only if others
do. Such behaviour can be rationalised using reciprocity theory (Rabin 1993,
Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger 2004 (D&K), Falk and Fischbacher 2006). It
describes agents as having a desire to be kind to those who are kind to them,
and unkind to those who are unkind to them. For example, if agent A invests,
agent B may view A as kind and invest himself.
1These agreements are often politically more feasible than binding commitments to
actually invest in public goods.
2In April 2016 The World Bank and The Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank
signed a co-financing agreement focusing on water, transport and energy. Each
party contributed $216 million to the first project, upgrading slums in Indone-
sia: www.brettonwoodsproject.org/2016/06/world-bank-and-aiib-signs-joint-co-financing-
agreement. Such agreements are also signed by private companies. The Asian Devel-
opment Bank, for instance, has an agreement with Chevron to invest in IT, construction
and engineering education: www.adb.org/site/cofinancing/partners. One area where cost-
sharing agreements are extensively used is in R&D investments (Katz 1986).
3Indeed higher investment is observed in related experimental games (Andreoni and
Varian 1999, Falkinger et al. 2000 and Charness et al. 2007.)
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The implications of reciprocity for public good provision are both well
established (e.g. Sugden 1984) and straightforward. If agents care enough
about reciprocity, maximal investment is possible, otherwise it is not. Such
investment is not due to a formal agreement to invest, but rather an in-
formal one (referred to as a gentlemen’s agreement, a tacit agreement or a
memorandum of understanding (MOU), for example).4 By contrast, little
is known about the implications of reciprocity for formal agreements over
public goods.
An obvious question follows: How does an opportunity to strike a formal
co-financing agreement perform under reciprocity? More specifically, one
may wonder: Can a co-financing mechanism deliver full investment? Does
such investment follow if all players sign the formal agreement? Is it impos-
sible if all players reject the formal agreement? To answer these questions,
we apply D&K’s model of reciprocity to an agreements game where players
choose whether or not to sign a formal cost-sharing agreement, then play
a public good game. We find that if in the absence of the mechanism, full
investment via an informal MOU is impossible and the public good return
is high, then such investment remains impossible if all players sign. How-
ever, if all players reject the formal agreement, then full investment becomes
attainable via an informal MOU. Despite not being the unique equilibrium,
this outcome is both stark and surprising.
For some intuition, consider the interaction of kindness and co-financing
agreements. Roughly, D&K say that agent i is kind to agent j if i could have
given j a much lower payoff by changing his behaviour. Agent i deviating
from a situation where all players sign and invest does reduce j’s payoff, but
not by much, as the cost-sharing agreement still has many signatories thus
provides large investment incentives. By contrast, if i deviates from a situa-
tion where no-one signs and all invest, j’s payoff is reduced considerably as
there is no such cost-sharing agreement. Kindness and hence reciprocity in-
centives to invest in public goods are thus larger when there are no signatories
than when there are many.
Our results provide several important insights. First, the existence of an
institution for making binding agreements is potentially critical for trigger-
ing informal cooperation via MOUs and other informal agreements. Second,
since our main result exemplifies a more general point that “high investment
is possible with few signatories and impossible with many”, formal agree-
4We shall refer to informal agreements to invest as MOUs throughout.
3
ments with few signatories may achieve better outcomes than those with
many. Third, and pointing to the more general feature underlying the pre-
vious insights, prior stages in games (here, an agreement stage) can increase
a player’s influence over others’ payoffs, since others may condition their ac-
tions on his early choice. This increase in payoff influence can “amplify”
psychological payoffs (in our case kindness) and make otherwise impossible
outcomes attainable.
We add to the literature on agreements (e.g. Barrett 2003, Battaglini
and Harstad 2016, Martimort and Sand-Zantman 2016) and an emerging
literature on mechanism design where players have reciprocity preferences
(Netzer and Volk 2014, Bierbrauer and Netzer 2016, Bierbrauer et al. 2017,
Dufwenberg and Patel 2017).
Our particular mechanism, cost-sharing agreements, falls into a class of
mechanisms where commitments on strategy-conditional side-payments are
made before a game is played (Jackson and Wilkie 2005, Ellingsen and Palt-
seva 2016). Cost-sharing is an important case of models where agents make
commitments to match others’ public good investments (Guttman 1978,
1987, Boadway et al. 2007) or to compensate others for their investment
(Varian 1994). Our game may also be relevant for agreements on R&D in-
vestment (Katz 1986) and International Environmental Agreements (IEAs)
(Barrett 1994), if they involve binding co-financing.
Understanding the role of reciprocity in IEAs is important for environ-
mental economists. Nyborg (2018) concurrently developed a model that ex-
tends D&K to cooperative games in order to apply it to Barrett’s IEAs model.
She finds that reciprocity can create weakly larger stable coalitions that ex-
hibit higher abatement. Less closely related are Hadjiyiannis et al. (2012)
and Kolstad (2014). The former studies the effect of a different notion of
reciprocity on abatement in a two-player game with no possibility to sign an
agreement. The latter examines the effect of equity- and efficiency-concerns
(Charness and Rabin 2000) in an IEAs game.
We structure the paper as follows. Section 2 presents a set of preliminaries
needed for our main result. Section 3 states and explains our main result on
how full investment is impossible if all players sign, but is possible if no-one
signs. Section 4 argues that our result illustrates a more general principle that
high investment is possible with few signatories but not with many, examines
comparative statics and identifies a zero-sign-zero-invest equilibrium. Section
5 offers reflections on alternative definitions of reciprocity and other game
forms. Section 6 concludes.
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2 Preliminaries
We introduce a public good game (2.1), an agreements game (2.2), and
D&K’s reciprocity model (2.3) which we apply to the public good game
(2.4).
2.1 The public good game (ΓP )
Let N = {1, . . . , n} be the set of players where n ≥ 4.5 Each i ∈ N simul-
taneously chooses ai ∈ {0, 1}, where 1 corresponds to investing in a public
good and 0 to not doing so. Let a = (ai)i∈N . Player i’s material payoff is
πi (a) = β
∑
j∈N
aj − γai,
where β is the public good benefit and γ the cost. Assume that nβ > γ >
β > 0 so that the individual cost exceeds the benefit and all players investing
maximises total payoffs. ΓP has a unique NE where for all i ∈ N , ai = 0.
While there are no formal agreements in this game form, a legitimate
interpretation of the strategy profile where all players invest is that players
have a MOU (or gentleman’s agreement) to invest. Clearly the MOU profile
is not a NE of ΓP .
2.2 The agreements game (ΓA)
The agreements game appends a prior stage to the public good game where
each player decides whether or not to sign a co-financing agreement: a bind-
ing commitment to share public good investment costs. In addition to cap-
turing this formal agreement, the game form still nests the previous informal
agreement, a MOU. If all players refuse to sign the co-financing agreement,
but still invest in the public good, they can be said to have an informal agree-
ment to invest, a MOU. Rejecting a formal agreement does not necessarily
imply a MOU as players may not plan to invest. We now describe the game
more precisely.
As before, N = {1, . . . , n}, n ≥ 4. In stage 1, the “sign-up stage”, each
i ∈ N simultaneously chooses a1i ∈ {0, 1}; 1 means signing the agreement, 0
5Our main result requires n ≥ 4, we thus focus on this in Sections 2 and 3. Two and
three player games are discussed in Section 4.
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not doing so. In stage 2, the “investment stage”, each i ∈ N simultaneously
chooses a2i ∈ {0, 1}; 1 means investing in the public good, 0 not doing so.
Let a1 = (a1i )i∈N , a
2 = (a2i )i∈N and a = (a
1, a2).
Let m(a1) =
∑
i∈N a
1
i be the number of signatories, x(a
2) =
∑
i∈N a
2
i the
number of players who invest, xm(a) =
∑
i∈N a
1
i a
2
i the number of signatories
who invest. Player i’s material payoff is
πi (a) =
{
βx (a2)− γa2i if a1i = 0
βx (a2)− γ xm(a)
m(a1)
if a1i = 1
,
where β is the public good benefit and γ the cost. The investment stage
involves the same decision as in ΓP , but with different payoff consequences
for signatories. Signatories have made a binding commitment to share their
investment costs. As before, nβ > γ > β > 0 and to avoid knife-edge cases
assume γ
β
is non-integer and n >
⌈
γ
β
⌉
.6 A strategy for i, si ∈ Si, specifies
an initial choice and a choice for each stage 1 history. We focus on pure
strategies throughout. Finally, let S = ×i∈NSi and s ∈ S.
As previously explained, we interpret the strategy profile where zero play-
ers choose to sign but all invest, as players having a MOU to invest.
The following observation highlights important properties of SPE of ΓA.
Observation 1 (Agreements game SPE)
(a) There does not exist a full investment SPE in ΓA.
(b) There exist zero investment SPE in ΓAwith [0,
⌈
γ
β
⌉− 1) signatories.
(c) There exist positive investment SPE in ΓA with
⌈
γ
β
⌉
signatories.
Our proofs are rather tedious. We provide them in the appendix. In the
main text we highlight key intuitions. Two aspects of Observation 1 are
particularly noteworthy: a MOU is not a SPE and SPE exhibit less than
full investment. To understand why, solve backwards. Non-signatories never
invest as they bear their full investment cost (thus a MOU to invest is not a
SPE). A signatory only invests if his costs are shared with sufficiently many
co-signatories, namely if m(a1) ≥ ⌈γ
β
⌉
. Given this, consider the sign-up stage.
There exist SPE with very few signatories, (b), as stage 1 deviation does not
6
⌈
γ
β
⌉
is the lowest integer strictly greater than γβ .
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induce investment. There also exist SPE with
⌈
γ
β
⌉
signatories, (c), as each
signatory is pivotal in inducing all signatories to invest. If there are greater
than
⌈
γ
β
⌉
signatories, a signatory can increase his payoff by deviating to not
signing as other signatories continue to invest, hence full investment is not
SPE, (a).
Observation 1 echos the results of Barrett (1994) and Varian (1994).7
2.3 Modelling reciprocity
We now incorporate reciprocity following D&K.8 Their approach uses “kind-
ness functions”. To determine whether i is kind to j one needs a reference
point, the equitable payoff. In defining this reference point, D&K argue that
only the set of efficient strategies, Ei, those not involving “wasteful” play,
are relevant.9 For ΓP , Ei = Si; for ΓA, si /∈ Ei iff si prescribes not investing
after a history of i signing and m (a1) ≥ ⌈γ
β
⌉
.
Let bik ∈ Sk denote i’s (point) belief of k’s strategy, then given (bik)k =i
the equitable payoff for j is the average of the most i believes he can “give”
to j given his strategy set and the least he believes he can “give” given his
efficient strategies:
πeij
(
(bik)k =i
)
= 1
2
[
max{πj
(
si, (bik)k =i
)
|si ∈ Si}+min{πj
(
si, (bik)k =i
)
|si ∈ Ei}
]
.
To define i’s kindness to j, let si (h) be i’s (updated) strategy which
is identical to si except that a
1
i must be consistent with reaching h. Let
bik (h) be i’s (updated) belief of k’s strategy. Given si (h) and (bik (h))k =i, i’s
kindness to j at h is
κij
(
si (h) , (bik (h))k =i
)
= πj
(
si (h) , (bik (h))k =i
)
− πeij
(
(bik (h))k =i
)
.
The material payoff i believes j receives (first term on RHS) is compared to
the equitable payoff (second term on RHS). If κij (.) > 0, i is kind to j. If
κij (.) < 0, i is unkind to j. If κij (.) = 0, i has zero kindness toward j.
7Both authors suggest mechanisms that give some SPE with partial investment and
some with zero investment.
8Our presentation is tailored to ΓP and ΓA; see D&K for general games.
9A strategy is efficient if there does not exist another strategy which for all histories
and others’ strategies gives no player a lower payoff, and for some history and others’
strategies gives at least one player a strictly higher payoff. See D&K pp. 275-6 for more
on motivation, and the precise definition for general games. See Section 5.1 of the current
paper for the implications of an alternative definition of efficient strategies.
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To capture reciprocity incentives D&K need a function reflecting how
kind i perceives j as being. Let cijk (h) denote i’s updated (point) belief
about j’s (point) belief about k’s strategy. Given bij (h) and (cijk (h))k =j, i’s
perceived kindness of j towards i at history h is
λiji
(
bij (h) , (cijk (h))k =j
)
= πi
(
bij (h) , (cijk (h))k =j
)
− πeji
(
(cijk (h))k =j
)
.
The material payoff that i believes j believes i receives (first term on RHS) is
compared to the equitable payoff (second term on RHS). If λiji (.) > 0 then
i perceives j as kind to him, etc.
Player i ’s utility at history h sums material and reciprocity payoffs
Ui
(
si (h) ,
(
bik (h) , (cikl (h))l =k
)
k =i
)
= πi
(
si (h) , (bik (h))k =i
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
material payoff
(1)
+ Y ·
∑
j∈N\{i}
(
κij
(
si (h) , (bik (h))k =i
)
· λiji
(
bij (h) , (cijl (h))l =j
))
︸ ︷︷ ︸
reciprocity payoff
,
where Y ≥ 0 is the sensitivity to reciprocity payoffs. If Y > 0 then i’s
preference for reciprocation toward j is captured by i’s utility increasing
when κij (.) and λiji (.) are non-zero with matching signs, reflecting mutual
kindness or unkindness.
Let Γ̂P and Γ̂A denote the public good game and agreements game where
players’ utilities are (1).10 To define an appropriate solution concept, let
s′i (h) be the strategy identical to si (h) at all histories except at h, where it
differs (given binary action choices there is only one such strategy).
10Γ̂P and Γ̂A are psychological games (Geanakoplos et al. 1989, Battigalli and Dufwen-
berg 2009).
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Definition 1 s ∈ S is a sequential reciprocity equilibrium (SRE) if for all i
and at each history h it holds that
(i) Ui
(
si (h) ,
(
bik (h) , (cikl (h))l =k
)
k =i
)
≥ Ui
(
s′i (h) ,
(
bik (h) , (cikl (h))l =k
)
k =i
)
,
(ii) cijk = bjk = sk for all j = i and k = j.
Condition (i) implies i best-responds at each history given his beliefs. Con-
dition (ii) requires beliefs to be correct. If Y = 0 then Definition 1 describes
a SPE (+ correct beliefs) in a game where utility equals material payoffs.
2.4 Reciprocity in the public good game
Full investment via a MOU was impossible in ΓP (2.1). Can it be a SRE in
Γ̂P ? If so, given equilibrium beliefs, for all i, j ∈ N , κij (1, .) = λiji (1, .) =
β
2
and κij (0, .) = −β2 . Therefore i would not deviate to not investing if
nβ − γ + (n− 1)Y (β
2
)2 ≥ (n− 1) β + (n− 1)Y (−β
2
)(β
2
). Put differently, a
MOU for full investment is a SRE of Γ̂P if Y ≥ Y ∗, where
Y ∗ =
2 (γ − β)
β2 (n− 1) .
Intuitively, a sufficiently high reciprocity sensitivity ensures that the reci-
procity cost of deviating to not investing (being unkind to co-players who
are kind to you) outweighs the material gain.
When a MOU for full investment is possible in the public good game
(Y ≥ Y ∗), unsurprisingly, it is also possible in the agreements game.11 Our
main result, in the next section, concerns the less obvious question of whether
the agreements mechanism (Γ̂A) can deliver full investment when a MOU for
full investment is impossible in Γ̂P , i.e. Y < Y
∗.
3 Main result
Can the agreements game deliver full investment if this is impossible without
the agreements mechanism (Y < Y ∗) and the stakes are high (large β)?
11See the Online Appendix for full details. The Online Appendix contains additional
formal results and proofs not included in the paper.
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Indeed it can, but not how one might expect. If all players sign the co-
financing agreement, full investment remains out of reach. However, full
investment is possible if all players refuse to sign and have a MOU to invest
instead. We first state the result formally (3.1), then provide intuition via
examples (3.2-3).
3.1 Formal statement
To state our result and help with later analysis, we introduce some notation.
Define
Y ′ :=
2(γ − β)
(n− 1)β(nβ − γ) , (2)
and note that if β > γ
n−1 then Y
′ < Y ∗.
Theorem 1 For all γ > 0 and n ≥ 4, there exists β′ ∈ ( γ
n−1 , γ) such that,
(a) if β ≥ β′ and Y < Y ∗, there does not exist a full investment SRE in
Γ̂A with n signatories,
(b) if β ≥ β′ and Y ∈ [Y ′, Y ∗), there exists a full investment SRE in
Γ̂A with 0 signatories. The SRE is described by 0 signing, then non-
signatories investing iff there are 0 signatories and signatories investing
iff there are at least
⌈
γ
β
⌉
signatories.
Note that Theorem 1(b) does not imply equilibrium uniqueness. For ex-
ample, we shall provide results on a zero-sign-zero-invest SRE in Section 4.
Nonetheless, we consider the equilibrium highlighted in Theorem 1(b) to be
our main contribution.
The theorem suggests that for high return public goods where full in-
vestment is impossible, the introduction of an agreements mechanism makes
full investment possible. Encouraging all players to actually sign however is
counterproductive. Instead, it is potentially a good thing if all parties reject
the co-financing agreement as a MOU to invest is then incentive compatible.
The strategies that support the full investment result – part (b) of the
theorem – may seem to require a deep understanding of the game by the
players. If a player deviates in stage 1 by signing, then no players invest
in stage 2. So a deviation in stage 1 would result in a large decrease in
material payoff for all players, and (as we show below) this is central for
10
incentive-compatibility. This requires that all players understand the full
consequences of varying degrees of take-up of the agreement, which may seem
a tall order. However, under our MOU interpretation where coordination is
achieved through discussions, such consequences would soon become common
knowledge as negotiators reveal the implications of deviation.
3.2 Highlighting the intuition: part (b)
We begin with part (b) of Theorem 1, the SRE involving a MOU to invest, as
it is more straightforward. Example 1 takes the stated profile, where no-one
signs and all invest on path, and shows that it is a SRE for an interval of Y
less than Y ∗.
Example 1 (No-one signs): Take Γ̂A and let n = 4, γ = 10, β = 9 and
Y ∈ [ 1
351
, Y ∗), where Y ∗ = 2(10−9)
92(4−1) =
2
243
. Consider the profile where,
• no-one signs,
• non-signatories invest iff there are 0 signatories,
• signatories invest iff there are at least 2 signatories.
Reason as follows to see that the profile is a SRE. Following a history of 0
signatories, i does not deviate to not investing if
4 · 9− 10 + 3Y · (26− 1
2
(26 + 0)
) · (26− 1
2
(26 + 0)
)︸ ︷︷ ︸
λiji(.)
≥ 3 · 9 + 3Y · (17− 1
2
(26 + 0)
) · (26− 1
2
(26 + 0)
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
λiji(.)
. (3)
Solving gives Y ≥ 1
351
, note that 1
351
< Y ∗ = 2
243
.
Following a history of 1 signatory, i does not deviate to investing for any
Y . Following a history of 2 signatories, signatory i does not deviate to not
investing if Y ≤ 4
157
; note that Y ∗ = 2
243
< 4
157
. Following histories of 2
or 3 signatories, non-signatory i does not deviate to investing if Y ≤ Y ∗.
Following a history of 3 or 4 signatories, signatory i does not deviate to not
investing for any Y . Player i does not deviate to signing in the sign-up stage
for any Y . The profile is thus a SRE for Y ∈ [ 1
351
, Y ∗). 
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Kindness amplification
Why is a MOU to invest incentive compatible in Example 1, when it would
not be if there had been no option to sign a co-financing agreement (Γ̂P with
Y < Y ∗)? The explanation centers on what we call kindness amplification.
To see this, contrast the 0 signatory subgame in Example 1 with the full
investment profile in Γ̂P . In both cases, i has the same material incentive to
deviate to not investing: a material payoff increase of 3·9−(4·9−10) = 1. His
reciprocity incentive however differs as kindness is higher (or amplified) in
Example 1 (e.g. λiji (.) =
9
2
in Γ̂P , see section 2.4, but λiji (.) = 13 in Example
1, see (3)). The amplified kindness implies that for a given Y , the decrease in
i’s reciprocity payoff from deviating to not investing is larger in Example 1
(3Y ·13 ·13−3Y ·4 ·13 = 351Y ) than in Γ̂P (3Y (92)(92)−3Y (−92)(92) = 2432 Y ).
A lower Y is thus sufficient to prevent i deviating in Example 1 than in Γ̂P ,
hence our result.
The fundamental reason as to why the agreements mechanism can am-
plify kindness is that it can increase a player’s ability to influence others’
behaviour. For instance, if j signs in Example 1, no-one invests, implying
i’s material payoff falls by 4 · 9 − 10 = 26. If j deviates to not investing in
Γ̂P , others’ actions are unchanged so i ’s material payoff falls by only 9 < 26.
Thus i perceives j as kinder in Example 1 than in Γ̂P .
3.3 Highlighting the intuition: part (a)
We now illustrate part (a) of Theorem 1. Example 2 has three parts, it takes
the parameters of Example 1 and demonstrates that for Y < Y ∗, no profile
where all players sign and invest on path is a SRE. The key intuition is that
kindness cannot be amplified as effectively as when there are zero signatories
on path (3.2). Part (i) demonstrates that a particular off-path investment-
stage behaviour implies sign-up stage deviation. Parts (ii) and (iii) show
that while alternative off-path investment-stage behaviours may avoid sign-
up stage deviation, they necessarily involve investment-stage deviation.
Example 2(i) (Sign-up stage deviation): Take Γ̂A and let n = 4, γ = 10,
β = 9 and Y < Y ∗ = 2
243
. Consider any profile where
• all players sign & invest on path,
• only signatories invest if there are 3 signatories.
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Player i’s sign-up stage incentives are identical to those for the full investment
profile in Γ̂P , i thus deviates to not signing as Y < Y
∗. 
It follows from Example 2(i) that all remaining candidate SRE (where all
players sign and invest on path) must involve: (a) a signatory who does not
invest when there are 3 signatories, or, (b) a non-signatory who invests when
there are 3 signatories. Examples 2(ii) and 2(iii) rule out candidate SRE with
properties (a) and (b) respectively by demonstrating that players deviate in
the investment stage.
Example 2(ii) (Signatory not investing with 3 signatories): Take Γ̂A
and let n = 4, γ = 10, β = 9 and Y < Y ∗ = 2
243
. Consider a profile where
• all players sign & invest on path,
• at history h where there are 3 signatories, some signatory i does not
invest.
By deviating to investing at h, signatory i can increase his material payoff
by 9− 10
3
= 17
3
. Can i’s reciprocity incentives prevent this deviation? Since i
not investing is less kind than investing, to maximise the reciprocity cost of
i’s deviation examine the profile where
• all players sign & invest on path,
• no-one invests if there are 3 signatories,
• all players invest if there are 2 signatories.
Player i’s reduction in reciprocity payoff from deviation at h is then 1144
3
Y <
2288
729
< 17
3
(first inequality from Y < Y ∗ = 2
243
), thus i deviates. 
Weak kindness amplification
Why can kindness be sufficiently amplified to prevent deviation in Example
1 but not in Example 2(ii)? The answer concerns the size of the material
loss that the reciprocity payoff need compensate in the relevant subgames.
In Example 1, following a history of zero signatories, the material loss of
investing was 1. In Example 2(ii), following a history of 3 signatories, the
material loss to a signatory of not investing was 17
3
> 1. More generally,
for high β, the size of the material loss from not deviating in the relevant
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subgame is lower for the case when there are zero signatories than when there
are many. Lower kindness is thus sufficient for non-deviation when there are
few signatories than when there are many.
To complete Example 2, part (iii) examines the remaining candidate SRE
(where all sign and invest on path) which involve all players investing when
there are 3 signatories (by Examples 2(i)-(ii)). It shows that for a non-
signatory to invest when there are 3 signatories, a signatory must not invest
when there are 2 signatories. However, since this signatory has an incentive
to deviate to investing, these profiles are not SRE either.
Example 2(iii) (Non-signatory investing with 3 signatories): Take
Γ̂A and let n = 4, γ = 10, β = 9 and Y < Y
∗ = 2
243
. Consider a profile where
• all players sign & invest on path,
• all players invest at h where all but i have signed
By deviating to not investing at h, non-signatory i increases his material
payoff by 10 − 9 = 1. Whether i’s reciprocity incentives prevent deviation
depends on behaviour following histories with 2 signatories. If all invest
when there are 2 signatories, i’s incentives are identical to the full investment
profile in Γ̂P , thus i deviates at h (Y < Y
∗). If only the signatories invest
when there are 2 signatories, then i deviates at h if Y < 1
108
, which is true
(Y < Y ∗ = 2
243
< 1
108
). For i not to deviate at h, it must be that at least 3
players do not invest when there are 2 signatories.
Suppose then that some signatory j does not invest when there are 2
signatories. Signatory j has a material incentive to deviate to investing.
To maximise the reciprocity cost of this deviation, suppose no-one invests
if there are 2 signatories and all invest if there is 1 signatory. Signatory j
deviates to investing when there are 2 signatories if Y < 2
143
, which is true
(Y < Y ∗ = 2
243
< 2
143
). 
For the non-signatory to invest when there are 3 signatories, his perceptions
of others’ kindness must be sufficiently amplified, this requires signatories to
not invest when there are 2 signatories. However, reciprocity incentives are
not sufficiently large to prevent a signatory deviating to investing for reasons
analogous to those discussed following Example 2(ii). Thus there does not
exist a full investment SRE where all sign on path.
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To summarise, the fundamental intuition behind part (a) of Theorem 1
is the difficulty of amplifying kindness when many players sign. In order to
prevent sign-up stage deviation, kindness must be amplified, this requires low
investment in subgames where there are n− 1 or n− 2 (3 or 2 in Example 2)
signatories. However, signatories have relatively large material incentives to
invest in such subgames (high β) and reciprocity payoffs are relatively low
(Y < Y ∗), hence the impossibility.
4 Robustness and relevance
In this section we examine various aspects of the robustness and relevance of
our main result.
4.1 Few signing versus many signing
Theorem 1 examined whether particular profiles (those with either zero or n
signatories, and full investment) are SRE. While these are clearly interesting
profiles, one may nonetheless wonder whether Theorem 1 exemplifies the
more general finding that “high investment is possible with few signatories
and impossible with many signatories” or whether the equilibria in focus
are just a special case of what may happen? We now provide a result that
suggests the equilibria studied in Theorem 1 are more than just a special
case.
Thus far we have defined a MOU to invest as the profile where zero players
sign a co-financing agreement, then all players invest. It seems equally rea-
sonable to interpret a profile where very few players sign the agreement, then
all players invest, as a MOU to invest (at least for the many non-signatories).
Proposition 1(b) demonstrates that such a MOU is also a SRE (cf. Theorem
1(b)). Theorem 1(a) identified the impossibility of full investment if there
are n signatories. Proposition 1(a) shows that this impossibility remains if
there are n− 1 signatories.
15
Proposition 1 For all γ > 0 and n ≥ 4, there exists β′′ ∈ ( γ
n−1 , γ
)
and
Y ′′ ∈ (0, Y ∗) such that,
(a) if β ≥ β′′ and Y < Y ∗, there does not exist a full investment SRE in
Γ̂A with n− 1 signatories,
(b) if β ≥ β′′and Y ∈ [Y ′′, Y ∗), there exists a full investment SRE in
Γ̂A with one signatory. The SRE is described by one player signing,
then non-signatories investing iff there is exactly one signatory, and
signatories investing always.
The intuition behind the result is analogous to that driving Theorem 1
(see section 3.2-3), kindness can be sufficiently amplified when there is only
one signatory but not when there are n − 1. Proposition 1 is a reassuring
robustness check and suggests an even more general insight that for high
value public goods, if the social goal is full investment, it is feasible with few
signatories but not with many.
4.2 When should no-one sign?
Theorem 1 states that for high value public goods, zero-signatories can lead
to full investment. However the result provides little idea of its importance in
the sense of answering questions like: How large is the interval of reciprocity
sensitivities for which the zero-sign-all-invest equilibrium exists? And what
are the determinants of the size of this interval? We now consider these
questions.
In order to explore the relevance of our SRE in the parameter space we
first amend our model. Under the current setup, as n tends to infinity, reci-
procity incentives outweigh material incentives by construction.12 In order to
avoid this feature, replace Y with y
n−1 in utility function (1), where y ≥ 0 is
the reciprocity sensitivity parameter. Normalising i’s reciprocity incentives
by the number of co-players implies that such incentives do not increase sim-
ply because there are more players in the game. Repeating the analysis given
this amendment, one finds y∗ = 2(γ−β)
β2
, y′ = 2(γ−β)
β(nβ−γ) and the following analog
12Also since limn→∞ Y ∗ = 0, Theorem 1 applies to a negligible set of parameters for
very large populations.
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of Theorem 1(b): if β ≥ β′ and y ∈ [y′, y∗), then there exists a full investment
SRE in Γ̂A with zero signatories.
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Given this amendment, we study the following ratio
ρ =
y∗ − y′
y∗ − 0 = 1−
β
nβ − γ . (4)
Note that 0 to y∗ are all the values of reciprocity sensitivity that imply full
investment is not a SRE in the public good game. ρ is the fraction of these
that allow zero-sign-all-invest to be a SRE in the agreements game. We are
only interested in ρ for parameters where the zero-sign-all-invest equilibrium
exists, that is β ≥ β′. For such β, y∗ > y′, thus ρ is strictly positive and its
comparative statics are as follows.
Proposition 2 For all γ > 0, n ≥ 4 and β ≥ β′,
(a) ρ is strictly increasing in n and as n tends to infinity, ρ tends to unity;
(b) ρ is strictly increasing in β and as β tends to γ, ρ tends to 1− 1
n−1 ;
(c) ρ is strictly decreasing in γ.
The result states that for high return public goods, a large share of reci-
procity sensitivities can lead to full investment via no-one signing if there
are many players, the return of the public good is high or the cost is low.
This is very intuitive. For example, consider the effect of n. Having more
players does not affect the y that can support a full investment SRE in the
public good game since i’s reciprocity incentive is unaffected by more players
who he perceives as just as kind as the existing co-players; thus y∗ does not
change. However, having more players does decrease y′. This is because with
more players, kindness is amplified more as the difference in material payoff
between everyone investing and no-one investing is larger, thus a lower y is
sufficient to prevent deviation. This increase in the difference between y∗ and
y′ implies a larger share of sensitivities supporting the SRE, hence, a higher
ρ.14 Intuitions for the effect of changes in the cost and benefit of the public
good are equally intuitive.
13Note also that with normalised reciprocity incentives, our result is relevant even for
large populations since y∗ does not depend on n.
14On the issue of the number of players, recall that Theorem 1 only applies to n ≥ 4.
When n = 3, an analog of Theorem 1(a) cannot be established because players have no
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Proposition 2 is not only informative on how different parameters affect
ρ, but also on the magnitude of ρ. Part (b) of the proposition provides an
upper bound to the share of sensitivity parameters supporting our SRE for
a given n and γ, 1− 1
n−1 . This upper bound is relatively high: since n ≥ 4,
it is at least 2
3
. Thus when the return of the public good is high, a large
share of sensitivities implying no investment in the public good game imply
zero-sign-all-invest is a SRE.
A lower bound to ρ would be informative, however this is difficult to come
by.15 Nonetheless, examples illustrate that even for slightly lower values of β,
the value of ρ is still relatively close to the upper bound. For instance, recall
Example 1 where n = 4, γ = 10 and β = 9. For this example, ρ = 0.654, that
is, zero-sign-all-invest is a SRE for 65.4% of reciprocity sensitivity parameters
such that full investment is impossible in the public good game (note that
given n and γ, the upper bound of ρ is 0.667).
4.3 Equilibrium multiplicity: Zero-sign-zero-invest
Even when the set of parameters supporting our zero-sign-all-invest SRE is
large, it is not the case that no-one signing an agreement necessarily implies
full investment. The reason for this is simply that the agreements game has
many SRE, including those where no-one signs followed by low investment.
More specifically, we have the following negative result.
Proposition 3 For all γ > 0 and n ≥ 4, there exists β′ ∈ ( γ
n−1 , γ
)
such
that if β ≥ β′ and Y ∈ [Y ′, Y ∗), there exists a 0 investment SRE with 0
signatories. The SRE is described by 0 signing, then non-signatories not
investing and signatories investing iff there are at least
⌈
γ
β
⌉
signatories.
That is, whenever a zero-sign-all-invest SRE exists, a zero-sign-zero-invest
SRE also exists. To see the intuition as to why, contrast the strategy pro-
files in Theorem 1(b) and Proposition 3. Note that they are identical other
material incentive to invest when very few sign, thus kindness can be sufficiently amplified
on path to support the all-sign-all-invest SRE. When n = 2, an analog of Theorem 1(b)
cannot be established since i can no longer amplify his kindness towards k by influenc-
ing the behaviour of j, thus a zero-sign-zero-invest SRE does not exist. See the Online
Appendix for full details.
15It is difficult to evaluate the limit of ρ as β tends to β′ from above since we do not
have an explicit expression for β′. Taking the limit of ρ as γ tends to nβ from below is
also not possible since the relevant β are such that β ≥ β′ and β′ is in general a function
of γ.
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than at the history following zero signatories. In both cases, players have
no material incentive to invest at this history. If zero invest at this history,
players do not view others as kind and thus have no incentive to deviate. If
all invest at this history, then players view each other as kind and reciprocat-
ing kindness prevents non-deviation only if Y is sufficiently high. Thus the
conditions supporting the zero-sign-all-invest SRE are more restrictive than
those supporting the zero-sign-zero-invest SRE.
Proposition 3 implies a clear need for caution when no-one signs an agree-
ment. It may be that full investment is more likely than zero investment
following zero signatories as the outcome is more unusual and also Pareto
dominant, so more salient and easier to coordinate on. However, such equi-
librium selection arguments are very context dependent so would need to be
considered on a case by case basis. The existence of the zero-investment SRE
does not affect our main insight: full investment is possible if very few sign,
but not if many do. However, it does underscore the need to tackle a difficult
coordination problem; simply not signing an agreement is not sufficient to
guarantee full investment.
One might expect a zero-sign-zero-invest SRE to always exist. This turns
out not to be the case as our next result states (as in 4.2, we normalise i’s
reciprocity incentives by the number of co-players, however a qualitatively
similar result can be established without the normalisation).
Proposition 4 For all γ > 0, n > 13 and β < 3γ
2(n+2)
, there does not exist a
SRE where 0 sign and 0 invest if y ∈
(
4(γ−β)
β(γ−4β) ,min
{
2(γ−β)
3β2
, 2(γ−β)
β(nβ−γ)
})
.
A zero-sign-zero-invest SRE does not exist when there are many players,
the return to the public good is sufficiently low and the reciprocity sensitivity
is at an intermediate value. Deviations from candidate equilibria are typically
in the one signatory subgame. In such subgames, non-signatories have no
material incentive to invest and given the low return to the public good and
relatively low reciprocity concern, any reciprocity incentive to invest is not
sufficiently large motivative investment. The signatory not investing is not
part of an equilibrium as he perceives non-signatories as kind (as they could
have signed and invested, forcing a lower material payoff on the signatory),
thus the signatory’s reciprocity incentives motivate deviation to investing.
Equally however, the signatory investing is not part of an equilibrium as
then the signatory views the non-signatories as unkind and thus has both
material and reciprocity incentives to deviate to not investing.
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While Proposition 4 implies that a zero-invest-zero-sign SRE does not
exist for all parameters, taken together with previous results we can begin
to infer something about how the existence of such equilibria are affected
by n. It is often found that larger groups provide fewer public goods (e.g.
Bergstrom et al. 1986). Reason as follows to see how this is reflected in
our results. Note that for y < y∗, Propositions 2 and 3 imply that as n
increases a larger share of y support a zero-sign-zero-invest SRE. In a similar
vein, notice that for the sufficient conditions presented in Proposition 4, an
increase in n reduces the size of the interval of y that implies non-existence
of such equilibria. Since Proposition 4 only identifies sufficient conditions for
non-existence of zero-sign-zero-invest equilibria, one must be careful not to
over-infer from this comparative static. Nonetheless, both findings go in the
expected direction, larger groups may struggle to provide public goods.
5 Two reflections
5.1 The role of efficient strategies a la D&K
Our main result depends critically on using D&K’s notion of “efficient strate-
gies,” rather than the corresponding notion in Rabin (1993). In this section
we present and discuss the issue.
The key point concerns how to calculate the zero-kindness threshold (i.e.
the equitable payoff, πeij ). In D&K’s theory this is done with respect to the
average of the lowest and highest payoff that i can achieve for j, if i uses
an efficient strategy, a notion D&K define independently of player i’s beliefs
(see p. 276 in D&K; footnote 9 in this paper). Rabin, by contrast (see his p.
1286), calculates the zero kindness threshold with respect to those strategies
that produce payoffs on the Pareto frontier, given i’s beliefs. With such a
definition the equilibrium highlighted in our main theorem would collapse:
Under Rabin’s definition a player who deviated at the sign-up stage would
do something inefficient, hence irrelevant for calculating the zero-kindness
threshold. In effect, the dramatic kindness amplification discussed in section
3.2. would be lost.
While this is not the place for a detailed discussion of the relative mer-
its of the two assumptions, we briefly describe two reasons why the D&K
assumption seems intuitive.16
16See section 5 of D&K for more discussion of the two assumptions.
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First, consider the kindness associated with a deviation from a purported
equilibrium. What beliefs could this player have had? Probably not equilib-
rium beliefs since he is deviating. When assessing the kindness of a deviating
co-player, one might ask oneself what payoff consequences the deviator had
in mind, and in particular whether he is inefficiently attempting to lower the
payoffs of all players. D&K’s key definition identifies the set of strategies
(the inefficient ones) for which no story can be told that explains the be-
haviour unless that story involves “waste” at some history. This is a set with
a meaningful interpretation, which helps one think about and interpret the
zero kindness threshold.
Second, D&K’s definition implies kindness changes continuously with be-
liefs. This seems psychologically intuitive. It also implies that equilibrium
existence is guaranteed, a convenient implication.
5.2 The phenomenon of kindness amplification
The main motivation of our work is to explore the impact of reciprocity in
our particular game forms, given our particular co-financing agreements and
MOUs interpretation. Our results uncovered a phenomenon that we labelled
kindness amplification. Analogous effects can be found in related game forms
with alternative economic interpretations. While it is beyond the scope of
this paper to explore the topic at length we now present the simplest example
which demonstrates that the phenomenon can imply similar but not identical
implications for public good provision in other game forms.
Example 4 (Cheap-talk first stage): Define ΓC as identical to ΓA except
that i’s material payoff is πi(a) = βx(a
2)−γa2i . First-stage actions in ΓC thus
have no material payoff consequences and can be interpreted as cheap-talk
messages sent prior to a public good game. For all γ and n ≥ 4, there exists
βC ∈ (γ/n, γ) and YC ∈ (0, Y ∗) such that
(i) if β ≥ βC and Y ∈ [YC , Y ∗), there exists a full investment SRE where all
players choose 0 in stage 1. The SRE is described by all choosing 0, then
players investing iff an even number of players chose 0 in the first stage.
(ii) if β ≥ βC and Y ∈ [YC , Y ∗), there exists a full investment SRE where
all players choose 1 in stage 1. The SRE is described by all choosing 1, then
players investing iff an odd number of players chose 0 in the first stage.17
17Proof available on request.
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The example illustrates that the existence of any material-payoff-irrelevant
first-stage action choice can amplify kindness and thus lead to full investment
(the profile may be interpreted as a MOU to invest). The intuition is identical
to that behind the Theorem 1(b) where no-one signed (i.e. took a material-
payoff-irrelevant-action) and then all players invested. In this cheap-talk
game however, since there are no material payoff consequences of sending a
particular message (unlike where at least two players choose to sign a co-
financing agreement), there is no analog to Theorem 1(a) i.e. full investment
is not impossible if all players take a particular first-stage action. The asym-
metric effects of all signing versus no-one signing in our main result cannot
be generated by a cheap-talk first stage.
6 Conclusion
In this paper we studied the ability of a co-financing agreements mechanism
to raise public good investment given reciprocity motivations. Our main re-
sult is that when full investment is impossible in the absence of an agreements
mechanism and the return to the public good is high, then full investment
remains impossible if all players sign the agreement, but is possible (via a
MOU) if all players reject the agreement. Critically, the informal agreement
to invest (the MOU) would not be possible if players had not met, tried
to sign a binding agreement, but then explicitly rejected it in favour of an
informal agreement.
Given our result, it is natural to wonder whether in reality we ever see par-
ties meet, try to sign a binding agreement, then walk away with a non-binding
agreement? As a possible example, take the 2015 UN Climate Change Con-
ference in Paris (aka COP21/CMP11). Many commentators have pointed out
that the agreement is not binding, in the sense that there are no penalties
for non-compliance (e.g. Cle´menc¸on (2016), Jacquet and Jamieson (2016)).
Arguably, negotiators could have made a binding, or formal, commitment
to co-finance each other’s efforts to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, but in-
stead they struck a non-binding MOU to exert such effort anyway, without
co-financing mandates (at least between industrial countries). This may be
an outcome along the lines that our Theorem 1 points to. Agents do not
sign a formal co-financing agreement, but rather reject the agreement and
coordinate on full investment nonetheless. The “soft-touch” Paris agreement
may be the kind of situation pointed to by Theorem 1: informal deals gain
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traction as other formal deals are shunned. And institutions that allow for-
mal agreements for co-financing to be signed, even when they are not, are
critical for spurring informal agreements to invest in public goods
Despite the usefulness of non-binding agreements, binding ones are often
also signed in reality. Where such an agreement is signed, only a subset of
potential signatories would typically actually sign. Strictly, our Theorem 1
is silent about binding agreements with few signatories. However, as argued
for in Section 4.1, it is reasonable to view the result as illustrating a more
general point that higher investment is feasible when few people sign a co-
financing agreement than when many do. This interpretation suggests that
reciprocity motivations may be able to explain why agreements with few
signatories nonetheless manage to achieve desirable outcomes
If MOUs are indeed the route to desirable outcomes, why shouldn’t in-
stitution designers just allow parties to discuss MOUs directly rather than
offering them the possibility to sign binding co-financing agreements? In
Section 5.2 we illustrated that such a meeting with cheap-talk messaging
can lead to full investment via many different action profiles, this may make
coordination difficult. By contrast, the number of routes to full investment
is smaller with a co-financing agreements institution, as if there are many
signatories, full investment is impossible. This difference would presumably
make coordination easier with a co-financing mechanism, a potentially im-
portant advantage of using co-financing agreements. Even with the option
of co-financing agreements, coordination problems are not solved as multiple
equilibria remain (e.g. see Section 4.3).
The overall lesson is clear: Institutions that offer opportunities for binding
agreements may be important even if such agreements are not struck or there
is low uptake. In our case, creating the possibility of a formal co-financing
agreement may promote actual investment in public goods, even if a co-
financing agreement is not signed.
Appendix
Proof of Observation 1
Apply backward induction to identify the SPE of ΓA. At h = a
1, non-
signatories do not invest and signatory i invests iff β ≥ γ
m(a1)
. Since γ
β
non-
23
integer, write the condition as iff m (a1) ≥ ⌈γ
β
⌉
. Given optimal behaviour
at all a1, consider the first-stage. First suppose there are less than
⌈
γ
β
⌉ − 1
signatories. Player i does not deviate in the first-stage as πi (.) = 0 regardless.
Thus this is a SPE. Second suppose there are
⌈
γ
β
⌉ − 1 signatories. Non-
signatory i deviates to signing if 0 < β
⌈
γ
β
⌉ − γ, which is true. Thus this is
not a SPE. Third suppose there are
⌈
γ
β
⌉
signatories. Signatory i does not
deviate to not signing if  γ
β
β − γ ≥ 0, which is true. Non-signatory i does
not deviate to signing if  γ
β
β ≥ (⌈γ
β
⌉
+1)β− γ, which is also true. Thus this
is a SPE. Fourth suppose there are more than
⌈
γ
β
⌉
signatories. Signatory i
deviates to not signing as other players invest regardless of his choice. Thus
this is not a SPE. The four cases are exhaustive. 
Proof of Theorem 1
(a) Take the set of strategy profiles that involve n players signing and in-
vesting on path. Partition this set into 3 subsets of profiles distinguished
by behaviour following a history of a1 such that m (a1) = n − 1: subset 1,
all invest; subset 2, all signatories invest only; and subset 3, all remaining
profiles. We take each subset in turn and demonstrate that no profile in the
subset is a SRE if β is sufficiently high and Y < Y ∗.
Subset 1: Consider any candidate SRE profile s∗ such that each i ∈ N
signs, then invests if a1 is such that m (a1) ≥ n − 1. Reason as follows to
show that there is no behaviour at histories such that m (a1) < n − 1 that
would imply s∗ is a SRE.
Consider h = a1 such that m (a1) = n − 1, so all players invest. Non-
signatory i has the same material incentive to deviate to not investing as
in ΓP . Given Y < Y
∗, a necessary condition for i not to deviate is that
λiji
(
s∗j , .
)
> β
2
(recall λiji (1, .) =
β
2
in Γ̂P ). The value of λiji
(
s∗j , .
)
at h,
depends on the action choices s∗ prescribes at history h′ where all except i
and j sign. If s∗ were such that n invest or all except j invest at h′, then
λiji
(
s∗j , .
)
= nβ − γ − 1
2
(nβ − γ + (n− 1) β − γ) = β
2
at h, thus i would
deviate at h. If s∗ were such that all except i invest or all except i and j
invest at h′, then λiji
(
s∗j , .
)
= nβ−γ− 1
2
((n− 1) β + (n− 2) β) = 3
2
β−γ < β
2
,
thus i would deviate at h. Therefore a necessary condition for i to not deviate
at h, is that s∗ must be such that some signatory l does not invest at h′.
Consider h′ and suppose s∗ prescribes signatory l does not invest. Sig-
natory l has a material incentive to deviate to invest at h′. We now show
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that for β sufficiently high and all Y < Y ∗, l’s reciprocity incentives are in-
sufficient to prevent deviation at h′. The change in signatory l’s reciprocity
payoff from playing s∗l rather than s
′
l (h
′, s∗l ) equals YΨ, where
Ψ :=
∑
k∈N\{l}
(κlk (s
∗
l , .)− κlk (s′l (h′, s∗l ) , .))λlkl (s∗k, .) .
If Ψ ≤ 0, then l deviates at h′. Suppose Ψ > 0. Signatory l does not deviate
at h′ if
Y ≥ (n− 2) β − γ
(n− 2)Ψ . (5)
Let Ŷ (β) denote the RHS of (5) as a function of β. For Y < Y ∗ we require
Ŷ (β) =
(n− 2) β − γ
(n− 2)Ψ <
2 (γ − β)
β2 (n− 1) = Y
∗.
Now argue that for sufficiently high β either Y < Y ∗ does not hold or l has an
incentive to deviate at h′. Note that limβ→γ Y ∗ = 0. Therefore for β in the
neighbourhood of γ, Y < Y ∗ requires limβ→γ Ŷ (β) ≤ 0. Evaluating Ŷ (γ),
note that the numerator of Ŷ (γ) is positive thus it must be that Ψ ≤ 0.
However if Ψ < 0 then l would deviate at h′ for β slightly lower than γ
as already argued, thus Ψ = 0 when β = γ. That we have supposed that
Ψ > 0 for sufficiently high β and deduced Ψ = 0 at β = γ, implies that the
denominator of Ŷ (β) approaches zero from above and hence the one-sided
limit limβ→γ− Ŷ (β) = +∞ which is greater than limβ→γ Y ∗ = 0, violating
Y < Y ∗. Thus for all Y < Y ∗ and β sufficiently high, l would deviate to
investing at h′.
Subset 2: Consider a candidate SRE profile s∗ such that each i ∈ N
signs, then invests if a1 is such that m (a1) = n, and if a1 is such that
m (a1) = n − 1, all except the non-signatory invest. At the initial node, i’s
incentives are identical to those in the full investment profile in Γ̂P . Thus i
deviates to not signing at the initial node for all Y < Y ∗. Hence s∗ is not a
SRE.
Subset 3 : Consider any remaining candidate SRE profile s∗ such that
each i ∈ N signs, then invests if a1 is such that m (a1) = n, it must be that
for history h′′ = a1 such that m (a1) = n − 1, there exists some signatory r
who does not invest. Reasoning analogous to that used to show signatory
l deviates to investing at h′ (end of subset 1) establishes that signatory r
deviates to investing at h′′. Hence s∗ is not a SRE.
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(b) Consider s∗ such that each i ∈ N does not sign, then invests if a1 is such
that m (a1) = 0 or a1i = 1 and m (a
1) ≥ 2, and does not invest otherwise. We
demonstrate that there exists Y ′ < Y ∗ such that no player deviates at any h
if Y ∈ [Y ′, Y ∗) and β is sufficiently large.
First consider h = a1 such that m (a1) = 0. Player i has a material
incentive to deviate to not investing and a reciprocity incentive to not do so.
His increase in reciprocity payoff from playing s∗i instead of s
′
i (h, s
∗
i ) is(
n−m(a1)− 1) · Y · (κij (s∗i , .)− κij (s′i (h, s∗i ) , .)) · λiji (s∗j , .)
+m(a1) · Y · (κil (s∗i , .)− κil (s′i (h, s∗i ) , .)) · λili (s∗l , .) , (6)
where j is a non-signatory and l a signatory. Since κij (s
∗
i , .) = λiji
(
s∗j , .
)
=
1
2
(nβ − γ) and κij (s′i (h, s∗i )) = 12 (nβ − γ) − β, this increase in reciprocity
payoff is larger than the reduction in material payoff if Y ≥ Φ, where
Φ :=
2 (γ − β)
(n− 1) β (nβ − γ) .
Note that if β > γ
n−1 , then Φ < Y
∗. Thus i does not deviate for Y ∈ [Φ, Y ∗).
Now consider h = a1 such that m (a1) > 0. No player has a material
incentive to deviate at a1 since for β > γ
2
,  γ
β
 = 2, thus action choices
following all a1 are identical to SPE profiles. We will demonstrate for suffi-
ciently high β and Y (but less than Y ∗), any reciprocity incentive to deviate
is less than the material incentive to not do so.
At h = a1 such that m (a1) = 1, player i has no reciprocity incentive to
deviate to investing, thus does not deviate. At h = a1 such that m (a1) = 2,
the change in signatory i’s reciprocity payoff from playing s∗i rather than
s′i (h, s
∗
i ) is(
n−m(a1)) · Y · (κij (s∗i , .)− κij (s′i (h, s∗i ) , .)) · λiji (s∗j , .)
+
(
m(a1)− 1) · Y · (κil (s∗i , .)− κil (s′i (h, s∗i ) , .)) · λili (s∗l , .) , (7)
where j is a non-signatory and l a signatory. For non-signatory j, κij (s
∗
i , .) =
β , κij (s
′
i (h, s
∗
i ) , .) = 0 and λiji
(
s∗j , .
)
= −β
2
. For signatory l, κil (s
∗
i , .) =
3
2
β−γ, κil (s′i (h, s∗i ) , .) = 12 (β − γ) and λili (s∗l , .) = 32β−γ. Substituting into
(7) gives Y
((
β − γ
2
)
(3
2
β − γ)− (n− 2)β2
2
)
, which is negative for sufficiently
large β. Signatory i’s reciprocity incentive to deviate to not investing at h is
no larger than the material incentive to not do so if
Y ≤
[ γ
2
− β(
β − γ
2
) (
3
2
β − γ)− (n− 2)β2
2
]
.
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For β sufficiently large, there exists Y satisfying the inequality and that
Y ≥ Φ (as limβ→γ [.] > 0 and limβ→γ Φ = 0).
Using (6), non-signatory i’s change in reciprocity payoff from playing s∗i
rather than s′i (h, s
∗
i ) is
1
2
Y β2 (n− 7). This is non-negative for n ≥ 7, thus i
does not deviate at h. For n ∈ [4, 6], i does not deviate at h if Y ≤ 2(γ−β)
β2(7−n) .
There exists Y satisfying the inequality and that Y ≥ Φ, since the RHS of
this inequality is greater than Φ if (n2 − 7) β + (1− n) γ > 0, which holds
given n ≥ 4.
Consider h = a1 such that m (a1) ∈ [3, n− 1]. Using (7), signatory i’s
change in reciprocity payoff from playing s∗i rather than s
′
i (h, s
∗
i ) is Y Ξ where
Ξ :=
(
m
(
a1
)− 1)(β − γ
m (a1)
)
β
2
− (n−m (a1)) β2
2
.
If Ξ ≥ 0, then i has no reciprocity incentive to deviate at h. Suppose Ξ < 0,
then i does not deviate if Y ≤
[
γ−βm(a1)
Ξm(a1)
]
. For β sufficiently large, there exists
Y satisfying the inequality and that Y ≥ Φ (as limβ→γ [.] > 0 > limβ→γ Φ =
0).
Non-signatory i’s change in reciprocity payoff from playing s∗i rather than
s′i (h, s
∗
i ) is
1
2
Y β2 (n− 2m (a1)− 1) (use (6)). If n − 2m (a1) − 1 ≥ 0, then
1
2
Y β2 (n− 2m (a1)− 1) ≥ 0, thus i has no reciprocity incentive to deviate at
h. If n− 2m (a1)− 1 < 0, then i does not deviate at h if
Y ≤ 2 (γ − β)
β2 (2m (a1) + 1− n) .
The RHS is strictly greater than Φ if (n2 − 2m (a1)− 1) β + (1− n) γ > 0
which is true as β tends to γ.
Finally, at h = a1 such that m (a1) = n and the initial node, player i has
neither material nor reciprocity incentives to deviate. Thus for β sufficiently
large, the profile is a SRE for Y ∈ [Φ, Y ∗), that is, Y ∈ [Y ′, Y ∗). 
Proof of Proposition 1
(a) Take the set of strategy profiles that involve n−1 signing and all investing
on path. First consider h = a1 such that m(a1) = n and suppose that some
i does not invest. Since i has a material incentive to invest, in order to
maximise his reciprocity incentive not to do so, suppose no-one invests at a1
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(to maximise how unkind he perceives his co-players as). Player i then does
not deviate to investing if Y ≥ 2
(nβ−γ)(n−1) , however note that as β tends to
γ, then RHS tends to 2
γ(n−1)2 which is greater than limβ→γ Y
∗ = 0. Thus for
sufficiently high β, i deviates to investing. Given this, restrict attention to
strategy profiles where all invest if all sign.
Note that if all players invest when there are n− 2 signatories then non-
signatory i would deviate to not investing when there are n − 1 signatories
given Y < Y ∗. It must thus be that some players do not invest when there are
n−2 signatories. Consider h = a1 such that m(a1) = n−2 and suppose that
signatory i does not invest. Since i has a material incnetive to invest, in order
to maximise his reciprocity incentive to not do so, suppose no-one invests at
a1. Signatory i then does not deviate to investing if Y ≥ 2(β(n−2)−γ)
(nβ−γ)(2β(n−2)−γ) .
However note that as β tends to γ, the RHS converges to a strictly positive
value while Y ∗ converges to zero. Thus for β sufficiently high, signatory i
deviates to investing when Y < Y ∗. Given this restrict attention to strategy
profiles where all signatories invest when there are n− 2 signatories.
Finally, given that all players invest if there are at least n− 1 signatories
and all signatories invest if there are n− 2 signatories, for h = a1 such that
m(a1) = n − 1, non-signatory i invests if Y ≥ 2(γ−β)
β(3β−2γ)(n−1) . However for β
sufficiently high, the RHS is strictly greater than Y ∗, thus i deviates to not
investing for Y < Y ∗. Hence there exists no SRE where all invest when there
are n− 1 signatories.
(b) Consider s∗ such that only one player signs, then i invests if only this
player signs or if a1i = 1 and m(a
1) ≥ 2, and does not invest otherwise. We
demonstrate that there exists Y ′′ < Y ∗ such that no player deviates at any
h if Y ∈ [Y ′′, Y ∗) and β is sufficiently large.
First consider h = a1 such that m(a1) = 0. Player i has no material
incentive to deviate to investing and given that he views all co-players as
unkind, he also has no reciprocity incentive to do so.
Next consider h = a1 such that m(a1) = 1. The signatory does not
deviate to not investing if Y ≥ 2(γ−β)
β2(n−1)(n−2) ; clearly the RHS is strictly
less than Y ∗. Non-signatory i does not deviate to not investing if Y ≥
2(γ−β)
β(βn−γ+(β(n−2)−γ)(n−2) . For a sufficiently high β, the RHS is strictly less than
Y ∗. Thus if Y ≥ max{ 2(γ−β)
β2(n−1)(n−2) ,
2(γ−β)
β(βn−γ+(β(n−2)−γ)(n−2)}, i does not deviate
at h.
Now consider h = a1 such that m(a1) = 2. Signatory i does not deviate
to not investing if Y ≤ 2β−γ
β(4β−γ) . Note that as β tends to γ, the RHS of the
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inequality tends to 1
3γ
, while Y ∗ tends to zero. Thus for a sufficiently high β,
signatory i does not deviate. Non-signatory i does not deviate to investing
since he has no material incentive to do so and perceives all his co-players as
unkind, so no reciprocity incentive to invest either.
For all h = a1 such that m(a1) > 2, see the proof of Theorem 1. Finally,
in the sign-up stage, player i has neither material nor reciprocity incentive
to deviate, thus the profile is a SRE. 
Proof of Proposition 2
(a) Write ρ(n) to denote the dependence of ρ on n. Note that for all n ≥ 4
and k > 0, ρ(n+ k)− ρ(n) = 1− β
(n+k)β−γ − 1 + βnβ−γ = β
2k
(nβ−γ)((n+k)β−γ) > 0.
Also note that limn→∞ ρ = 1. (b) Note that
∂ρ
∂β
= γ
(nβ−γ)2 > 0 and that
limβ→γ ρ = 1− 1n−1 . (c) Note that ∂ρ∂γ = − βγ(nβ−γ)2 < 0. 
Proof of Proposition 3
Note that the profile is identical to that examined in Theorem 1, other than
that following a history of zero signing, zero invest. Given Theorem 1, we
need only verify non-deviation following three histories: the initial history,
that following zero signatories and that following one signatory.
At the initial history deviation has no effect on any player’s material
payoff, thus i has no incentive to deviate. Following a history of zero or one
signatories, i has no material incentive to invest and since he perceives others
as unkind, he has no reciprocity incentive to invest either. 
Proof of Proposition 4
Restrict attention to strategy profiles where zero sign and zero invest on
path throughout this proof. We demonstrate that given the conditions in
Proposition 4, within the permitted set of strategy profiles: (a) any profile
where there is a non-signatory who invests at some m(a1) = 1 is not a SRE;
(b) given non-signatories do not invest at m(a1) = 1, any profile where there
is a non-signatory who invests at some m(a1) = 2 is not a SRE; (c) given
that non-signatories do not invest if m(a1) ∈ {1, 2}, any profile where a
signatory does not invest at some m(a1) = 1 is not a SRE; (d) given that
non-signatories do not invest if m(a1) ∈ {1, 2}, any profile where a signatory
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invests at some m(a1) = 1 is not a SRE; and hence there exist no SRE where
zero sign and zero invest on path.
(a) Consider a strategy profile where zero sign and zero invest on path
where there exists a non-signatory, i, who invests at some m(a1) = 1. At
this decision node, h, non-signatory i deviates to investing if
β − γ + y
n− 1β[m1λSI +m2λSN +m3λNI +m4λNN ] < 0, (8)
where m1 +m2 = m(a
1), m1 +m2 +m3 +m4 = n− 1, λSI is non-signatory
i’s perception of the kindness of a signatory who invests at h; λSN is non-
signatory i’s perception of the kindness of a signatory who does not invest
at h; and λNI and λNN are defined analogously for i’s perceptions of fellow
non-signatories’ kindness to i.
To ensure i deviates at h, we let [.] in (8) take its maximum value, then
identify a condition on y such that (8) holds. To identify an upper bound
to m1λSI + m2λSN , first let w denote the number of players other than
non-signatory i and signatory j who invest at h. Note that λSI = λSN =
1
2
(β(w + 2)− γ), which is maximised if w = n− 2. Using m1 +m2 = 1, the
maximum value of m1λSI +m2λSN is thus
1
2
(βn− γ).
We next identify an upper bound to m3λNI + m4λNN for two different
cases. First consider profiles where non-signatory i does not invest if non-
signatory j were to sign. Let x and z be the number of players other than
non-signatory i and non-signatory j who invest at h and the node where j
has also signed respectively. Then λNI =
1
2
(β(x−z+2)−γ) ≤ 1
2
(nβ−γ) and
λNN =
1
2
(β(x−z)−γ) < 1
2
(nβ−γ). Thusm3λNI+m4λNN ≤ 12(nβ−γ)(n−1).
Substituting the bounds into (8), implies that for profiles where i does not
invest if any non-signatory j signs, i deviates at h if y < 2(γ−β)
β(nβ−γ) .
Second consider profiles where non-signatory i invests if non-signatory j
were to sign. Then λNI =
β
2
(x−z+1) and λNN = β2 (x−z−1). Consider the
profile where all non-signatories who invest at h also invest in the subgame
where j also signs and z = x − 1. Then λNI = β and λNN = 0, thus
for β sufficiently small λNI >
1
2
(nβ − γ). For such β, the upper bound of
m3λNI+m4λNN = (n−1)β. Substituting this into (8), implies that i deviates
at h if y < γ−β
β2
.
One can show that for any other profile where zero sign and zero invest on
path, at least one of the two conditions on y that we have derived is sufficient
to ensure non-signatory i deviates at h. Thus if y < min
{
2(γ−β)
β(nβ−γ) ,
γ−β
β2
}
, non-
signatories cannot invest if there is only 1 signatory.
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(b) Consider strategy profiles where non-signatories do not invest at
m(a1) = 1 and some non-signatory i invests at some h where m(a1) = 2.
Reasoning analogous to that in part (a) establishes that a sufficient condi-
tion for deviation by i at h is y < 2(γ−β)
3β2
. Note that this implies the second
condition on y derived in part (a).
(c) Consider strategy profiles where non-signatories do not invest when
m(a1) ∈ {1, 2} and some signatory i does not invest at h where i is the
only signatory. Let x equal 1 if i would invest if non-signatory j signs and 0
otherwise. If β < γ
4
, signatory i deviates at h if y > 4(γ−β)
β(γ−2β)(x+1)−2β) . Note
that the RHS of this condition is highest if x = 0, thus if y > 4(γ−β)
β(γ−4β) then i
deviates at h.
(d) Consider strategy profiles where non-signatories do not invest when
m(a1) ∈ {1, 2} and some signatory i invests at h where i is the only signatory.
Let x equal 1 if i would invest if non-signatory j signs and 0 otherwise. For
β < γ/2, i’s perception of j’s kindness to i is 1
2
(γ
2
(d− 2)+ β(1− d)) which is
negative for all d. Thus i has neither reciprocity nor material incentives to
invest at h and thus deviates.
To conclude the proof simply note that: 2(γ−β)
3β2
> 4(γ−β)
β(γ−4β) if β <
γ
10
;
2(γ−β)
β(nβ−γ) >
4(γ−β)
β(γ−4β) if β <
3γ
2(n+2)
; and 3γ
2(n+2)
< γ
10
if n > 13. 
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